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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Statutes:
UCA §57-1-38
57-1-38. Release of security interest.
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Secured lender" means:
(i) a mortgagee on a mortgage;
(ii) a beneficiary on a trust deed;
(iii) a person that holds or retains legal title to real property as security for financing the
purchase of the real property under a real estate sales contract; and
(iv) any other person that holds or retains a security interest in real property to secure the
repayment ofa secured loan.
(b) (i) "Secured loan" means a loan or extension of credit, the repayment of which is secured
by a mortgage, a trust deed, the holding or retention of legal title under a real estate sales
contract or other security interest in real property, whether or not the security interest is
perfected.
(ii) A judgment award secured by a judgment lien is not of itself a secured loan. A
subsequent written agreement between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor
concerning payment of the judgment is a secured loan if it otherwise qualifies under the
definition in Subsection (l)(b)(i).
(c) "Security interest" means an interest in real property that secures payment or
performance of an obligation. Security interest includes a lien or encumbrance.
(d) "Servicer" means a person that services and receives loan payments on behalf of a
secured lender with respect to a secured loan.
(2) This section may not be interpreted to validate, invalidate, alter, or otherwise affect the
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foreclosure of a mortgage, the exercise of a trustee's power of sale, the exercise of a seller's
right of reentry under a real estate sales contract, or the exercise of any other power or
remedy of a secured lender to enforce the repayment of a secured loan.
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a secured loan
within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is liable to another secured
lender on the real property or the owner or titleholder of the real property for:
(a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of the failure to release
the security interest, including alt expenses incurred in completing a quiet title action; and
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.
(4) A secured lender or servicer is not liable under Subsection (3) if the secured lender or
servicer:
(a) has established a reasonable procedure to release the security interest on a secured loan
in a timely manner after the final payment on the loan;
(b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 days after receipt of the final payment
because of the action or inaction of an agency or other person beyond its direct control.
RULES:
URCP Bule 12(b)(6):
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.
URCP Rule 56. Summary Judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
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obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and
served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories^ and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rale judgment is not rendered
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing
of the motion> by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly,
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits

shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such fects as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of aH papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall ber attached thereto or served therewith: The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this role, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading but his response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for tm£ if he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate^ shall be entered
against him.
(f) When affidavits aarer unavailable. Should it appearfromthe affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of die court ^t any time that
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any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorneys fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
UCJA Rule 4-501. Motions,
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents with
the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except proceedings before
the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and
copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion
shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided
in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte
application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length
of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess often pages, the application
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition ta motion. The responding party shall file and serve upon all
parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion,
and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph (1)((D)
of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum within five
days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision.
The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to
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Submit for Decision." The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the
motion was served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date the
reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the
motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities m support of a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts
as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement
of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists
followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the party's contention,. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the court, or
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any claim in the
action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal memorandum
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered
to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal
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memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or the court on its own motion may
strike the request and decide the motion without oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may
grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence and
compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the motion does
not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct
arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim record
shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
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VIII
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEES' RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION. THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE WHEN IT GRANTED
THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. SCHULTZ AS COUNSEL
FOR MS. PETT, AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND
REVERSIBLE WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT MS. PETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
THE APPELLEES' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MS. PETT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ASA MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEES' RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION.
A. THERE WERE NO UNDISPUTED FACTS ON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT
COULD RELY IN GRANTING THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
RULE 12(b)(6) URCP OR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES.
The appellees' claim that their improper and impermissible assertions of alleged
facts, contained in their memorandum in support of their Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss,
constitute undisputed facts under the provisions of Rule 4-501(2XB)of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration i^yet another deliberate misrepresentation of the facts and the law
to this Court. Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration specifies as
follows:
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
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Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief
Statement of the Rule:
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise
statement of material facts which support the party's contention.. Each
disputedfact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement (Emphasis added.)
Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration does not apply to
motions to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP. Likewise, Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration does not apply to motions made under Rule 12(bX6)
that were converted into a motion for summary judgment because the trial court improperly
considered matters outside the pleadings when rendering its decision on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.
A party is under no obligation to dispute assertions of material fact made in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. A party filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not even permitted to make factual
assertions. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be based solely on a plaintiffs complaint, a
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defendant's counterclaim or a third party's complaint. On a motion made under Rule
12(b)(6) URCP, the court looks only to material allegations of complaint and not to extrinsic
documents. £ge, Wright v. University of Utah 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App 1994.) Utah
mandates that when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP, only the
matters pleaded in the complaint may be considered. See Olson v. Park- Craig-Olson. Inc.,
815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991), declaring that "under Rule 12(b)(6), court looks at
facts as pleaded to determine if party is entitled to relief " see also. Colman v. State Land
Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990), declaring that under Rule 12(b)(6) a court looks only to
material allegations of complaint.
Because die appellees did not file a motion for summary judgment, (Record at
page(s) 53-54) Ms. Pert was under no obligation to dispute line by line or paragraph by
paragraph, the appellees' improper and impermissible assertions of fact contained in the
appellees' memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Ms. Pett had no way of
knowing in advance that the trial court would improperly consider the perjured affidavit
submitted by the appellees when the trial court ruled on and granted the appellees' motion to
dismiss. Therefore, Ms. Pett was not required to file a memorandum in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment that had not been filed, and her memorandum in opposition
to the appellees' motion to dismiss cannot be reviewed under a summary judgment standard
when no motion for summary judgment was ever filed.
Because the appellees did not file a motion for summary judgment, the improper and
impermissible assertions of fact based on the perjured affidavit submitted by the appellees
are not deemed admitted under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. The appellees' assertions to this Court that their improper and
impermissible assertions of fact based on the perjured affidavit submitted by the appellees
are deemed admitted under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is
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a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts of this case and the applicable law.
The trial court had no undisputed facts upon which it could grant summary judgment
in favor of the appellees, even assuming the trial court granted summary judgments rather
than granting the appellees' motion to dismiss, which it did not do. Under clear and
controlling Utah law, the trial court's grant of the appellees' motion to dismiss was improper
and reversible error. Therefore, the trial court's order granting the appellees' motion to
dismiss under must be reversed as a matter of law.
B. MS. PETT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DISPUTE ANY ASSERTIONS OF
ALLEGED FACTS IMPROPERLY AND IMPERMISSIBLY ALLEGED IN THE
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE APPELLEES FILED A
MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) URCP NOT A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
As previously set forth in this brief, Ms. Pett was not required to dispute the factual
allegations of the appellees set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion to
dismiss. See Wright v. University of Utah: Olson v. Park- Craig-Olson- Inc.; Colman v
State Land Bd.. supra. Therefore, because the appellees filed a motion to dismiss rather
than a motion for summary judgment, Ms. Pett was not required to dispute the improper and
impermissible assertions of fact alleged in the appellees' memorandum in support of their
motion to dismiss.
Contrary to the appellees' spurious and disingenuous assertions, Ms. Pett is not
raising for the first time on appeal her claim that the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" was
never sent to her. The appellees' own documents prove beyond any doubt that the "do-ityour-self reconveyance kit" was never sent to her. Ms. Pett is simply asserting that no
competent unbiased finder of fact could conclude that the appellees sent her the "do-it-yourself reconveyance kit", when, as the appellees admit, the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit"
was sent to Ms. Pett's brother, whom the appellees do not dispute was not an owner of the
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property, either at the time the mortgage was paid in full or at the time the appellees falsely
claim they sent the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett. (Appellees' brief, page
19,1[2.)
Ms. Pett is asserting that the trial court's finding of fact to wit: "Lundberg sent these
documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002, " is factually incorrect based on the
appellees' own documents. £fi£ the March 3, 2003 memorandum decision of the trial court
page 8, paragraph 2 wherein the trial court states: "Lundberg sent these documents to
Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002, " (Emphasis added.) (Record at page(s) 275) The
appellees' own documents prove no documents of any nature whatsoever were sent to Ms.
Pett on January 8, 2002. (Record at page(s) 61-65)
Likewise Ms. Pettis asserting that the trial court's finding of fact to wit: ((The
documents were delivered to Plaintiff's porch on January 9, 2002. These documents were
sent to Plaintiff 5Q days after receiving payment in full " Again, the appellees own
documents prove that no documents of any nature whatsoever were sent to Ms. Pett on
January 8, 2002 or delivered to her on January 9, 2002. (Record at page(s) 61-65) As a
factual matter, no documents could have been delivered to Ms. Pett on January 9, 2002,
because na documents were ever sent to her.
The appellees' false and spurious assertion that Ms. Pett is disputing factual
assertions for the first time on appeal is nothing more than a pathetic attempt to distract this
Court from the real issuer on appeal, i.e., that: (1) the appellees filed a motion to dismiss
under the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6) URCP; (2) that the trial court granted the appellees'
motion do dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) URCP, and improperly; and (3) that the trial court
unlawfully made factual findings in conjunction with the appellees' motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6).
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In pertinent part, Rule 12(b) URCP provides as follows:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Neither Rule 12 URCP nor any case interpreting Rule 12 URCP declares, suggest or even
implies that factual allegations improperly made in a memorandum in support of a motion to
dismiss are deemed admitted if the motion to dismiss is converted unto a motion for
summary judgment by the court considering matters outside the pleading. Furthermore,
Rule 12(b) specifically mandates that if a court is going to treat a motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant matter, Ms. Pert was not given any opportunity to present any material
to dispute a motion for summary judgment because she had no idea until the trial court
rendered its memorandum decision that the trial court was improperly and unlawfully
considering matters outside Ms. Pett's complaint when ruling on the appellees' motion to
dismiss. Therefore, Ms. Pert did not have the opportunity to present any material in
opposition to a summary judgment motion.
Ms. Pett was under no obligation to dispute the improper and impermissible
assertions of fact alleged by the appellees in conjunction with their motion to dismiss. The
trial court improperly and unlawfully made factual findings in conjunction with the
appellees motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Ms. Pett did not have the opportunity to
present any material in opposition to a summary judgment motion, because she had no
notice that the trial court was improperly and unlawfully considering matters outside Ms.
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Petfs complaint when ruling on the appellees' motion to dismiss. Therefore, the trial
court's grant of the appellees' motion to dismiss must be reversed as a matter of law.
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT APPLICATIONS OF
LAW TO UNDISPUTED FACTS, AS THE APPELLEES FALSELY AND
DISINGENUOUSLY CLAIM.
The appellees falsely and disingenuously claim that the trial courts findings of facts
to wit:
(1) "When the facts of this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it
is seen that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in
a timely manner;"
(2) u the procedure was followed in goodfaith; "
(3) "the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the
Defendant; and"
(4) "the documents were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff"
(record at page(s) 275), are applications of law to facts, rather than factual findings by the
trial court. That assertion is just another deliberation of the facts and in law, in the neverending stream of deliberate and disingenuous misrepresentations of fact and law by the
appellees in this case.
Reasonableness and good faith are always a factual conclusions. See Wardley Better
Homes and Garden v. Cannon. 21 P.3d 235, 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2001 UT App 48, Utah
App., Feb 15, 2001 citing Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct App. 1991). "To
clarify the matter: As to whether the party lacked good faith, the trial court must make a
factual finding of a party's subjective intent;" see also. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973
P.2d 932 (Utah, 1998) reiterating the holding of Wardley Better Homes and Garden and
Jeschke v. Willis. And see Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah, 1998), wherein the Utah
Supreme Court stated that the trial court was required to make factual findings as to
whether members of religious movement who had deeded tracts of land to trust controlled
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by movement, but had continued to live on land, had good faith belief that they held life
estate in lands.
It is, therefore, indisputable that the trial courts findings to wit: "When the facts of
this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it is seen that a reasonable
procedure was established to release the security interest in a timely manner; " and "the
procedure was followed in good faith;" are factual findings and not applications of law to
undisputed facts. The only facts that are undisputed on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) URCP are the allegations of Ms. Pett set forth in a complaint. See Colman v. State
Land Bd.. supra.
The appellees admit that the trial court's findings to wit: "the reconveyance of the
subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the Defendant; and "the documents were
sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff" are factual findings. (Appellees'
brief, page 20, % 4. However, the appellees falsely claim that those findings of fact are
"merely inescapable logical inferences that follow from the undisputedfacts." Id. However,
as previously established in this brief, the only facts that are undisputed on a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(bX6) URCP are the allegations of set forth in a complaint.
The appellees' assertion that Ms. Pett is disputing for the first time on appeal factual
allegations of the appellees that Ms. Pett was required to dispute at the trial court level is a
deliberate misrepresentation of the facts and the law to this Court. Ms. Pett simply had no
duty to dispute any improper and impermissible factual allegations asserted by the appellees
in their motion to dismiss. Utah law on this point is clear and unequivocal. On a motion to
dismiss the trial court can only consider the factual allegations contained in the complaint,
counterclaim or third party complaint, and Rule 4-501(2) does not apply to motions to
dismiss. Neither Rule 12 URCP nor any case interpreting Rule 12 URCP declares, suggest
or even implies that factual allegations improperly made in a memorandum in support of a
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motion to dismiss are deemed admitted if the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion
for summary judgment by the court considering matters outside the pleading.
Therefore, none of the appellees' factual allegations made in conjunction with the
appellees' motion to dismiss are deemed admitted for any purpose whatsoever, and Ms. Pett
was not required to dispute them. Ms. Pett had no way of knowing in advance that the trial
court would improperly and unlawfully accept the factual assertions of the appellees
contained in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss as true or that the trial
court would improperly grant the appellees motion to dismiss based on extrinsic documents
that are under clear and controlling Utah law specifically excluded on a motion to dismiss.
Furthermore, the trial court's factual ftndingto wit "When the facts of this case are
applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it is seen that a reasonable procedure was
established to release the security interest in a timely manner;" cannot be supported by any
evidence in the record of this case. Nowhere in the appellees' memorandum in support of
the appellees motion to dismiss do the appellees claim that sending titleholders of real
property a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" is the appellees' normal, regular, usual and/or
ordinary way of reconveying a security interest in real property to titleholders of the real
property. The only assertion by the appellees in this case is that when dealing with Ms. Pett,
the appellees sent Ms. Pett a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" rather than simply
reconveying the appellees security interest in Ms. Pett's property back to her. Therefore, the
trial court had no evidence from which it could make a factual conclusion that: "[IJt is seen
that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in a timely
manner."
The trial court's factual conclusions that:
(1) "When the facts of this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it
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is seen that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in
a timely manner;"
(2) "the procedure was followed in good faith;"
(3) "the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the
Defendant; and"
(4) "the documents were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff,"
(record at page(s) 268), are not based on any evidence in the record of this case. There
simply is no evidence to marshal to support the trial court's improper and unlawful findings
of fact, because the appellees have not asserted, claimed or offered any evidence of any
nature whatsoever that the appellees use the "do-it-yourself reconveyance kit" as a regular
and routine part of their "business operations" or that the appellees have ever used the "doit-yourself reconveyance kit" in conjunction with any reconveyance or release of a security
interest in real property other than when dealing with Ms. Pett.1
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully made findings of fact, which
cannot be supported by the record, on a motion to dismiss the trial court's memorandum
decision granting the appellees motion ta dismiss must be reversed as a matter of law.
D. MS. PETT DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISPUTE ANY
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, AS MANDATED BY RULE 12(b) URCP.
As previously set forth in this brief, Rule 12(b) URCP mandates that:
If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all
1. In their "course of proceedings," page 8, footnote 1, the appellees falsely claim that Hansen Land Title Company was the
trustee of the appellees security interest in Ms. Pett's home. While Hansen Land Title Company was the initial trustee at the
time Ms. Pett obtained a mortgage with Eagle National Mortgage, the appellees have had five substitutions of trustee filed in
their false andfraudulentefforts to foreclose on Ms. Pett's home. The appellees assertion that Hansen Land Title Company
was the trustee for the appellees trust deed on Ms. Pett's home is just another lie by the appellees and their counsel. The
appellees' counsel was the trustee Bruce Shapiro. Jorgensen and Lundberg were just local counsel for Shapiro's appearance.
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parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
In the instant matter, Ms. Pert was not given any opportunity to present any material to
dispute a motion for summary judgment because she had no idea until the trial court
rendered its memorandum decision that the trial court was improperly and unlawfully
considering matters outside Ms. Pett's complaint when ruling on the appellees' motion to
dismiss.
Ms. Pett properly and timely filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the appellees'
motion to dismiss. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, in effect at that time, that was the only document Ms. Pett was entitled to
file with respect to the appellees' motion to dismiss.
The trial court never informed Ms. Pett or her counsel that it was going to consider
matters outside Ms. Pett's complaint in ruling on the appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial
court never gave Ms. Pett the opportunity to file any documents of any nature whatsoever
with respect to a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Ms. Pett did not have the
opportunity to present any material in opposition to a summary judgment motion. The trial
court simply granted the appellees' motion to dismiss without applying any legal standard
whatsoever.
Because Ms. Pett was under no obligation to dispute the improper and impermissible
assertions of fact alleged by the appellees in conjunction with their motion to dismiss,
because the trial court improperly and unlawfully made factual findings in conjunction with
the appellees motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), because Ms. Pett did not have the
opportunity to present any material in opposition to a summary judgment motion, the trial
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the appellees' motion to dismiss.
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Therefore, the trial court's grant of the appellees' motion to dismiss must be reversed as a
matter of law.
E. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF
FACTS TO BE TRUE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS.
Even if this Court were to assume that everything the appellees stated in their motion
to dismiss is true and even if this Court were to assume that the allegations of fact set forth
in the appellees9 memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss were deemed admitted,
the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss under a
Rule 12(b)(6) URCP standard or under a Rule 56 URCP standard.
Utah Code §57-1-38 specifies as follows:
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a
secured loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is
liable to another secured lender on the real property or the owner or
titleholder of the real property for:
(a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of the failure to
release the security interest, including alt expenses incurred in completing a quiet
title action; and
(b) reasonable attorneys'fees and court costs.
(4) A secured lender or servicer is not liable under Subsection (3) if the
secured lender or servicer:
(a) has established a reasonable procedure to release the security interest on a
secured loan in a timely manner after the final payment on the loan;(b) has complied
with this procedure in goodfaith; and
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 days after receipt of the
final payment because of the action or inaction of an agency or other person
beyond its direct control. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code §57-1-38 requires a secured lender or servicer to "release" the security interest
on a secured loan within 90 days of the receipt of the final payment. Utah Code §57-1-38
does not state that a secured lender may simply send documents to a titleholder and tell the
titleholder to go get the security interest released at the titleholder's own expense.
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When interpreting a statute, we generally assume each term of the statute
should, if possible, be given an interpretation that is in accord with the
commonly accepted meanings of its words.
Hector. Inc. v. United Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 741 P.2d 542 (Utah, 1987), citing Board of
Education v. Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) and Grant v. Utah State
Land Board. 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). Black's Law Dictionary defines
release as follows:
The relinquishment, concession or giving up of a right, claim or privilege, by
the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against
whom it might have been demanded or enforced. "
Black's Law Dictionary further defines "release of mortgage" as follows:
A written document which discharges the obligation of a mortgage upon
payment and which is given by the mortgagee to mortgagor or holder of equity
and recorded in the office where deeds and other instruments of conveyance
are recorded.
Utah courts have long held that the word "release," when used in connection with an
interest in real estate, is a word of conveyance and intended to pass title. §££ Ruthrauff v.
Silver King Western Min. & Mill. Co.. 80 P.2d 338 (Utah 1938), declaring:
The operative words therein, "remise, release and quitclaim, " have often been
judicially defined and applied. They are words of conveyance and are effective
to pass the grantor's title, if any, to the grantee. They are not mere words of
release, whatever may be the meaning of "release " when employed alone.
In Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. and Loan Assfn. supra., the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Mortgage release statute and trust deed reconveyance statute are in pari
materia; they serve exact same purpose of protecting borrowers who secure
their debt by interest in real estate from lenders who refuse to return security
when debt is discharged; statutes hold lenders to a high degree of care and
promptness in clearing title to a borrower's property when debt is paid since
lender no longer has legitimate interest in security and borrower has great
interest in freeing property of security interest.
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Clearly, the intended meaning of "release" in Utah Code §57-1-38 is its normal and
usual meaning and the same as stated in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western Min. & Mill. Co.r
it is a word of conveyance. It means a written document which discharges the obligation of
a mortgage upon payment. It does not mean simply sending a "do-it-your-self reconveyance
kit" to a titieholder. Simply sending a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to a titleholder
does not convey title and it is not a relinquishment, concession or giving up of a right, claim
or privilege, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against
whom it might have been demanded or enforced. Simply sending a "do-it-your-self
reconveyance kit" to a titleholder is not a reasonable procedure to reconvey or release a
security interest to the titleholder, especially when most titleholders are not familiar with
reale state procedures or real estate law. And in this case, where the "do-it-your-self
reconveyance kit" was not even sent to Ms. Pett, there can be no question that the appellees'
sending Ms. Pett's brother a do-it-yourself reconveyance kits does not comply with the
provisions of Utah Code §57-1-38.
In South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988) this Court held:
While a trustee's reconveyance is not referred to explicitly in § 57-1-1, a
reconveyance serves to release a security interest in property and therefore to
"alien," i.e., alienate, that interest. See Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 53 (1986).
And, in Tretheway v. FurstenaiL 40 P.3d 649 (Utah App. 2001), this Court specifically held
that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1- 33. l(l)(a) requires a reconveyance of trust property when an
obligation secured by a trust deed is satisfied. In Tretheway v. FurstenaiL this court
declared:
A partial release of the Trust Property is not sufficient. This interpretation
comports with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1- 33. l(l)(a) (Supp. 1999), which requires
the trustee of a trust deed to reconvey trust property to the beneficiary
"fwjhen an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied."
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The law in Utah with respect to the obligation to reconvey a trust deed upon final payment
has been recognized by Utah courts for nearly sixty-five years. In Chapman v. Schiller, 83
P.2d 249 (Utah 1938), the Utah Supreme Court declared: "A trustee under the ordinary
deed of trust has authority only to foreclose the mortgage or cancel or reconvey the
mortgaged or trust property upon payment. There is no right under Utah law to simply send
a titleholder a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" rather than reconveying a security interest
as required under Utah law.
Utah Code §57-1-38 requires a secured lender or servicer to release the security
interest on a secured loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan, not
just send the titleholder documents and tell the titleholder to go obtain a release at the
titleholder's own expense. Under clear and controlling Utah law, a secured lender or
servicer is required to release the security interest on a secured loan within 90 days after
receipt of the final payment of the loan, not just send the titleholder documents and tell the
titleholder to go obtain a release at the titleholder's own expense. Therefore, the appellees'
sending a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett's brother, who was not even a title
holder on Ms. Pett's property, and telling Ms. Pett's brother to go have the trust deed
released at his own expense does not comply with the requirements of Utah Code §57-1-38.
Furthermore, the appellees have not established or claimed that they use the "do-it-your-self
reconveyance kit" for reconveyance of all trust deeds or any trust deeds other than when
dealing with Ms. Pert.
The appellees have only claimed that in this particular situation, with Ms. Pert, that
the appellees allegedly used the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to "release" their security
interest in Ms. Pett's property. The appellees and their counsel simply sent the "do-it-yourself reconveyance kit" and addressed envelope containing the "do-it-your-self reconveyance
kit" to Ms. Pett's brother rather than Ms. Pett as the appellees final action to harass, vex,
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annoy, and increase Ms. Pett's cost of litigation with the appellees. The appellees and their
counsel sent the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" and addressed envelope containing the
"do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett's brother rather than Ms. Pett out of spite and
vindictiveness for ten years of litigation with Ms. Pett. The appellees normal and regular
procedure for releasing a security interest in a titleholder's real property is not to send a "doit-your-self reconveyance kit." Therefore, the appellees sending a "do-it-your-self
reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett's brother did not comply with the appellees obligation to
release or reconvey their security interest in Ms. Pett's property to her.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. SCHULTZ AS COUNSEL FOR MS.
PETT.
The facts of this case are in no way similar to the facts of Watkiss & Cambell v Foa
&Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). In Watkiss the opposition did not file a perjurious
affidavit to which only the counsel for Foa could reply and contradict the perjurious
assertions submitted by the opposing party. In Watkiss. the counsel for Foa was not
required to choose between allowing perjured statements being accepted as fact or filing an
affidavit controverting perjurious statements. In Watkiss. L. Charles Spafford, the counsel
for Foa, voluntarily presented his own personal counter-affidavit, stating that he was
familiar with the billing practices in the region and that after reviewing the record in the
case, he was of the opinion that Watkiss's bill was excessive. As the Utah Supreme Court
noted in Watkiss. any attorney could have submitted the affidavit voluntarily filed by
Spafford in opposition to Watkiss' motion for summary judgment.
In this case Mr. Schultz only filed an affidavit because he had to do so to controvert
the perjurious statements of Jorgensen. Jorgensen prepared a perjurious affidavit at the
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request of the appellees and their counsel. The appellees then suborned Jorgensen's perjury
by filing Jorgensen's perjurious affidavit with the court. Ms. Pett's counsel, Mr. Schultz,
had no alternative other than to file an affidavit controverting the perjurious statements of
Jorgensen or to allow Jorgensen's perjurious statements to be accepted as true. Unlike the
attorney in Watkiss, no one other than Mr. Schultz could controvert the perjurious affidavit
of Jorgensen.
In Watkiss- the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[WJe deem it to be generally inadvisable for members of the bar to testify in
litigation where they personally represent a party. The needfor the testimony
of counsel must be compelling and must be necessary to preserve the cause of
action as set forth in rule 3.7 above.
Clearly Mr. Schultz's affidavit controverting the perjurious statements of Jorgensen is
justified under the holding of Watkiss & Cambell v Foa & Son. Undisputedly, Mr.
Schultz's testimony was needed and necessary to preserve Ms. Pett's cause of action that
would have been dismissed based on the perjurious assertions of Jorgensen but for Mr.
Schultz's affidavit.
In her perjurious affidavit, Jorgensen claims that she had the alleged conversation
with Mr. Schultz and that during the course of that alleged conversation she entered into an
oral agreement with Mr. Schultz, whereby it was agreed that the appellees would simply
send Ms. Pett do-it-yourself reconveyance forms. However, neither Jorgensen nor the
appellees can speeify when the alleged conversation allegedly took place. Neither Jorgensen
nor the appellees can specify where the alleged conversation allegedly took place. And,
neither Jorgensen nor the appellees can produce any evidence that the alleged conversation
ever took place.

The appellees and Jorgensen have had ample opportunity to provide evidence that the
alleged conversation that Jorgensen claims she had with Mr. Schultz ever took place. They
have not done so because the alleged conversation never took place and the appellees as
well as Jorgensen know that it never took place.
Mr. Schultz's phone records for the time period during which the alleged
conversation took place prove that Mr. Schultz never made any calls to Jorgensen or her
firm. Neither Jorgensen nor the appellees have produced, or can produce, any phone
records substantiating Jorgensen's claim that she ever had the alleged phone conversation
with Mr. Schultz. Neither Jorgensen nor the appellees have done so, and cannot do so,
because neither Jorgensen nor the appellees knew a phone number where Jorgensen could
have contacted Mr. Schultz during the time period she claims to have had the conversation
with Mr. Schultz.
Neither the appellees nor Jorgensen claim that there was a face-to-face meeting
between Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz, because neither the appellees nor Jorgensen knew
where Mr. Schultz was on any given day and, therefore, dared not specify a date or time for
the alleged conversation because Mr. Schultz may well have been in court, in a deposition, a
meeting with clients or out of state on any date they falsely claim the conversation took
place.
At the time Jorgensen falsely claims that she had the alleged conversation with Mr.
Schultz Mr. Schultz's office number was a Heber phone number and his voice mail was a
Provo phone number. Jorgensen's office was in Salt Lake City. Therefore, if the alleged
conversation occurred as Jorgensen claims^ she would have phone records confirming the
long distance call to Mr, Schultz and could have produced those phone records.
Neither the appellees nor Jorgensen have produced or can produce, any
documentation evidencing or memorializing the alleged conversation. Every other
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conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen was memorialized in either a court
document or an email because Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen did not trust each other.
Jorgensen's assertion that Mr. Schultz would enter into any type of agreement with
Jorgensen without memorializing the agreement in writing is just ludicrous.
Under the holding ofWatkiss, the trial court could not disqualify Mr. Schultz for
failing an affidavit that only he could file and which was necessary to preserve Ms. Pett's
cause of action against the appellees. If the trial court was going to grant the defendants'
motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz based on Jorgensen's perjured claim that she entered into
an agreement with Mr. Schultz, whereby it was agreed that the defendants would simply
send Ms. Pett do-it-yourself reconveyance forms, the trial court was to require the appellees
to provide some modicum of evidence that the alleged conversation ever took place prior to
concluding that Mr. Schultz was a necessary witness to the substance of the fictitious
conversation. At the very least, the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
If Mr. Schultz had not disputed that the conversation ever took place but only
disputed the substance of the conversation, then the frial court would have been correct in
disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. Likewise, if Mr. Schultz had voluntarily
filed an affidavit rather than being forced to file an affidavit to rebut the perjurious
assertions of Jorgensen, the trial court would have been correct in disqualifying Mr. Schultz
as counsel for Ms. Pett. However, when Mr. Schultz only filed an affidavit controverting
the perjurious statements of Jorgensen, because he had no alternative but to file the affidavit
or allow Ms. Pett's case be dismissed, it was improper for the trial court to conclude that the
conversation Jorgensen alleged she had with Mr. Schultz ever took place and preclude Mr.
Schultz from representing Ms. Pett based oUthe perjurious statements of Jorgensen. At a
minium, the trial court had to first require the appellees to prove that the alleged
conversation with Jorgensen ever took place before the trial court could determine that Ms.
-19-

Schultz was a necessary witness to the alleged conversation. By determining that Mr.
Schultz was a necessary witness to the alleged conversation, without first determining that
the alleged conversation ever took place, the trial court ruled, on the basis of Jorgensen's
perjurious and unsupported affidavit, that the conversation in fact took place as Jorgensen
alleged and that the only question concerning the alleged conversation was the substance of
the conservation.
If the alleged conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen actually took place,
the appellees and Jorgensen have the ability to prove that it took place. Neither Mr. Schultz
nor Ms. Pett can prove a negative, i.e., that the alleged conversation with Jorgensen did not
take place. However, they can prove that Mr. Schultz never initiated any calls to Jorgensen
and that Mr. Schultz never personally met with Jorgensen during the time period that the
appellees and Jorgensen claim that the alleged oral conversation took place.
Although Mr. Schultz cannot prove that the alleged conversation with Jorgensen ever
took place, Mr. Schultz is willing to submit to a polygraph examination concerning the
alleged conversation. If the polygraph results establish that Mr. Schultz is lying about not
participating in the conversation, alleged by Jorgensen to have occurred, Mr. Schultz will
personally pay all of the appellees' cost and fees and will submit himself to this court, the
district court and/or the state bar for whatever disciplinary action is appropriate.
Ms. Pett invites Jorgensen to likewise submit to a polygraph examination to
determine if the alleged conversation with Mr. Schultz ever took place. However, Ms. Pett
knows that Jorgensen will never agree to submit to any such examination, because Jorgensen
knows she never had any such conversation with Mr. Schultz and she knows that a
polygraph examination will show that she is laying about that alleged conversation.
It was prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court to determine, based on
Jorgensen's perjurious affidavit that the alleged oral conversation between Jorgensen and
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Mr. Schultz in fact took place. The trial court was required to at the very least conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine if the alleged conversation with Jorgensen ever took place
before disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pert. The trial court abused its discretion
in determining that the alleged conversation between Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz ever took
place, without requiring the appellees and Jorgensen to provide any evidence supporting
Jorgensen's perjurious claim that the alleged conversation took place. Therefore, this Court
must issue an order reversing the trial court's memorandum decision disqualifying Mr.
Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO GRANT MS.
RETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE MEMORANDUM OF THE APPELLEES IN
OPPOSITION TO MS. PETTS MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Although Ms. Pett withdrew her appeal of the trial court's failure to grant her Motion
to Strike the memorandum of the appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the appellees have nonetheless chosen to assert that failure as an issue on appeal
and argue that issue. Therefore, Ms. Pett will respond to the appellees spurious and
disingenuous argument.
Rule 4-501(l)(B) specifies that: "The responding party shall file and serve upon all
parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. " (Emphasis added.) The trial court deliberately
ignored this provision when computing the time period in which the appellees had to
respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment, and, therefore, improperly denied Ms.
Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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The trial court applied one standard for timely responses to Ms. Pett in this case and a
different standard to the appellees. The trial court improperly concluded that the appellees'
time to respond to Ms. Pett's motion for Summary Judgment ran from the time Ms. Pett filed
her Motion with the trial court rather than the date on which Ms. Pett served the Motion on
the appellees. Then, the trial court concluded that the appellee's response to Ms. Pett's
Motion for Summary Judgment was timely when it was allegedly mailed rather than when it
was filed. The proper standard for computation of time is just the opposite.
The time calculation for the appellees to respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary
Judgment began on the day Ms. Pett mailed the Motion to the appellees, not on the day she
filed die Motion with the trial court. If calculation of the time to respond to a motion begins
on the day it is filed with the court, a party's time to respond could expire prior to the time
the motion was ever served on the party or the party could have only a few days in which to
respond to the motion rather than the ten days plus mailing time and excluded time provided
for in the UCJA and the URCP. Calculation of time to respond to a motion based on the
date a motion is filed with the court is never the appropriate standard for the calculation of
the time to respond to a motion.
In this case, the trial court improperly and unlawfully concluded that the date from
which to calculate the permissible time for the appellees' response to Ms. Pett's Motion for
Summary Judgment was the date the trial court entered Ms. Pett's Motion on the docket
sheet rather than the date on which Ms. Pett served the appellees with her Motion for
Summary Judgment. The trial court concluded that Ms. Pett served her Motion for
Summary Judgment on the appellees on November 30r 2002 but then calculated the time
period for the appellees to respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment from
December 2, 2002, the date the trial court entered Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment
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on the docket sheet. (Record at page(s) 268) That conclusion was improper and prejudicial
to Ms. Pett and constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court.
The proper calculation for the date on which the appellees memorandum was due is
ten days from the November 30, 2002. Excluding November 30, as the date Ms. Pett mailed
her Summary Judgment Motion to the appellees and excluding Sunday, December 1st,
December 2nd through 6th count as five of the appellees ten days to respond. December 7
and 8 are excluded, because the ten days for the appellees to respond is less than eleven
days. December 9 through 13 are then counted as the appellees last five days in which to
respond. Saturday, December 14 and Sunday, December 15 are included in the three
additional days for service mail added to the appellees time to respond, because the three
additional days for service by mail include intervening Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.
Therefore, December 16, 2002 was the appellees' last day for the appellees to timely and
properly file any response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court admits that the appellees did not file their memorandum in opposition
to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment until December 18, 2002, but nonetheless
improperly and unlawfully concluded that the appellees had until December 18, 2002 to file
their memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 4-501
UCJA, however, specifies that a response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed
within ten days, not mailed within ten days. It was, therefore, unlawful and prejudicial for
the trial court to accept the appellees' memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for
Summary Judgment as timely and properly filed on December 18, 2002, when Rule 4-501
UCJA specifies that the memorandum must be filed no later that ten days, not mailed no
later than ten days
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully determined the time period in
which the appellees could timely file a response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary
-23-

Judgment, the trial court's denial of Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the memorandum of the
appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed, and
the trial court directed to enter an order striking the appellees' memorandum in opposition to
Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary
Judgment will be unopposed after the appellees untimely memorandum in opposition to Ms.
Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment is stricken, the trial court should also be directed to
grant Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment as an unopposed motion.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court erred when it granted the appellees' Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion. The trial
court improperly and unlawfully considered matters outside of Ms. Pett's complaint when it
granted the appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial court improperly and unlawfully made
findings of facts in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss. Even if the trial court had
decided the appellees' motion to dismiss under the standard for summary judgment specified
in Rule 56 URCP, the trial court improperly and unlawfully made findings of facts and
granted the appellees' Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on those improper, inaccurate and
unlawful findings of fact. Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to have this Court issue an order
reversing the trial courts grant of the appellees' motion to.
The trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the
appellees' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. The trial court
improperly determined that Mr. Schultz in fact had a conversation with Jorgensen wherein
Mr. Schultz agreed that the appellees could simply send a "do-it-yourself reconveyance kit"
to Ms. Pett so that she could have the appellees' trust deed reconveyed, rather than requiring
the appellees to reconvey the trust deed to Ms. Pett, as required by Utah law. The appellees
did not, and cannot, produce any evidence establishing that any conversation between Mr.
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Schultz and Jorgensen ever took place, as falsely alleged by Jorgensen in her perjurious
affidavit. The trial court improperly assumed that Jorgensen's perjury was true and
improperly disqualified Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett without requiring any proof that
the alleged conversation took place. Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to have this Court
reverse the trial court's order disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett and require
that the appellees provide proof that the alleged conversation between Mr. Schultz and
Jorgensen ever occurred.
The trial court also improperly and incorrectly calculated the time period in which the
appellees had to file a motion in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment
and improperly and unjustifiably denied Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment.
WHEREFORE, Ms. Pett respectfully moves this Court for an order reversing the trial
court's decision granting the appellees' Rule 12 (b)(6) motion, reversing the trial court's
decision granting the appellees' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett and
denying Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the untimely and improper memorandum of the
appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Pett also requests
that she be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal.

- /A
Respectfully submitted this

day of January 2004.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Sheri Pett
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